
JOHN T. FLOYD LAW FIRM
Houston Criminal
Lawyer
EXPERIENCED CRIMINAL
DEFENSE LAWYER
TRIALS, SENTENCINGS, AND APPEALS
FEDERAL AND STATE CRIMINAL DEFENSE
Phone (713) 224-0101
E-mail jfloyd@JohnTFloyd.com
"Serious Criminal Defense in Houston
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Corporate Crime
On July 9, 2002, President Bush called on Congress to give the Administration
new powers to enforce corporate responsibility and to improve oversight
of corporate America, including:
- Tough new penalties for mail and wire fraud.
- Strengthened laws to crack down on obstruction of justice.
- New authority for SEC to freeze improper payments to corporate executives when a company is under investigation.
- Increased the accountability of officers and directors.
- Barred insiders from selling stock during blackout periods when workers were unable to change their 401K plans.
- Created a new securities fraud provision with a 25 years maximum term of imprisonment.
- Directed the Sentencing Commission to review sentencing white collar crime, obstruction of justice, securities, accounting, and pension fraud cases.
- Required CEO’s and CFO’s to personally certify that financial records submitted to the SEC fully comply with securities laws and fairly present the financial condition of the company.
- Made it a crime to willfully certify any such financial report knowing it was false or non-compliant, punishable up to maximum of 20 years in prison.
- Criminalized the alteration of falsification of any document with the intent to obstruct the investigation of any matter within the jurisdiction of a US department or agency.
- Criminalized retaliatory conduct directed at corporate whistleblowers and others.
- Required that audit papers be retained for five years and criminalized failure to maintain them for five years.
- Obtained over 500 corporate fraud convictions or guilty pleas.
- Charged over 900 defendants and over 60 corporate CEO’s presidents with some sort of corporate fraud crime in connection with over 400 filed cases.
- Obtained charges against 31 Enron defendants, including 21 former executives, obtained convictions of 11 Enron defendants including its former CFO and treasurer, and seized over $161, 000,000 related to alleged frauds at Enron.
Among other important provisions, The Sarbanes-Oxley Act imposes new criminal penalties for securities fraud, attempts or conspiracies to commit fraud, certifying false financial statements, document destruction or tampering, and retaliating against corporate whistleblowers. The Act also contains enhanced penalties for mail and wire fraud and ERISA violations.
Section 802. Criminal Penalties for Altering Documents
Previous law: Prior to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, anyone who "corruptly persuades" others to destroy, alter or conceal evidence can be prosecuted under 18 U.S.C. § 1512. Section 1512 reaches destruction of evidence with intent to obstruct an official proceeding which may not yet have been commenced. However, Section 1512 does not reach the "individual shredder." While prosecution of obstruction under 18 U.S.C. § 1505 does not require "corrupt persuasion," it does require the existence of a pending proceeding. In addition, existing law does not explicitly address the retention of accounting work papers for a fixed period of time.
Amendment: Section 802 adds two new criminal provisions, 18 U.S.C. §§ 1519 and 1520. Section 1519 expands existing law to cover the alteration, destruction or falsification of records, documents or tangible objects, by any person, with intent to impede, obstruct or influence, the investigation or proper administration of any "matters" within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States, or any bankruptcy proceeding, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or proceeding. This section explicitly reaches activities by an individual "in relation to or contemplation of" any matters. No corrupt persuasion is required. New Section 1519 should be read in conjunction with the amendment to 18 U.S.C. 1512 added by Section 1102 of this Act, discussed below, which similarly bars corrupt acts to destroy, alter, mutilate or conceal evidence, in contemplation of an "official proceeding."
Accountants who fail to retain the audit or review workpapers of a covered audit for a period of 5 years will violate Section 1520, which creates a new felony, with a maximum period of incarceration of ten years. Under rulemaking authority granted in Section 1520(b), the SEC will promulgate rules relating to the retention of workpapers and other audit or review documents.
New 18 U.S.C. § 1519 provides:
Whoever knowingly alters, destroys, mutilates, conceals, covers up, falsifies, or makes a false entry in any record, document, or tangible object with the intent to impede, obstruct, or influence the investigation or proper administration of any matter within the jurisdiction of any department or agency of the United States or any case filed under title 11, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter or case, shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
New 18 U.S.C. § 1520 provides:
(a)(l) Any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to which section l0A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-l(a)) applies, shall maintain all audit or review workpapers for a period of 5 years from the end of the fiscal period in which the audit or review was concluded.
(2) The Securities and Exchange Commission shall promulgate, within 180 days, after adequate notice and an opportunity for comment, such rules and regulations, as are reasonably necessary, relating to the retention of relevant records such as workpapers, documents that form the basis of an audit or review, memoranda, correspondence, communications, other documents, and records (including electronic records) which are created, sent, or received in connection with an audit or review and contain conclusions, opinions, analyses, or financial data relating to such an audit or review, which is conducted by any accountant who conducts an audit of an issuer of securities to which section l0A(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of l934 (15 U.S.C. 78j-l(a)) applies....
(b) Whoever knowingly and willfully violates subsection (a)(l), or any rule or regulation promulgated by the Securities and Exchange Commission under subsection (a)(2), shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than l0 years, or both.
(c) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to diminish or relieve any person of any other duty or obligation imposed by Federal or State law or regulation to maintain, or refrain from destroying, any document.
Sec. 805. Review of Federal Sentencing Guidelines for Obstruction of Justice and Extensive Criminal Fraud
Previous Law: Questions have arisen whether the Sentencing Guidelines sufficiently address obstruction of justice crimes.
Amendment: This section directs the Sentencing Commission to undertake an expedited review of these issues, particularly in light of the two new obstruction of justice statutes, described above. It also directs the Sentencing Commission to consider a number of factors such as destruction of a large amount of evidence, participation of a large number of individuals, or destruction of particularly probative or essential evidence, which might be considered sufficiently aggravating as to warrant additional enhancements or inclusion as offense characteristics. The Attorney General has advised the Sentencing Commission of this provision and asked the Commission to implement it fully and expeditiously.
Sec. 807. Criminal Penalties for Defrauding Shareholders of Publicly Traded Companies
Previous Law: Title 18 does not have a specific crime directly prohibiting securities fraud schemes. Prosecutors have found it necessary to reach many securities fraud schemes through the mail and wire fraud statutes. Securities fraud has also been prosecuted as a violation of provisions of title 15.
Amendment: New 18 U.S.C. § 1348 creates a specific felony for securities fraud punishable by up to 25 years incarceration. This provision complements existing securities law. The statute requires a nexus to certain types of securities, no proof of the use of the mails or wires is required. The text of the new section provides:
Whoever knowingly executes, or attempts to execute, a scheme or artifice-
(1) to defraud any person in connection with any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781) or that is required to file reports under section 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780(d)); or
(2) to obtain, by means of false or fraudulent pretenses, representations, or promises, any money or property in connection with the purchase or sale of any security of an issuer with a class of securities registered under section 12 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 781) or that is required to file reports under section l5(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 780(d));
shall be fined under this title, or imprisoned not more than 25 years, or both.
Sec. 902. Attempts and Conspiracies to Commit Criminal Fraud Offenses
Previous Law: Under Chapter 63 (Mail Fraud) of Title 18, conspiracies to violate the mail fraud statute (§ 1341), the wire fraud statute (§ 1343), the bank fraud statute (§ 1344) and the health care fraud statute (§ 1347) are punishable by a maximum 5 year sentence. The wire fraud offense did not explicitly reach "attempts" to commit the substantive offense. However, this was not an impediment in practice, because proof of a scheme to defraud did not necessarily require proof that the scheme was successful.
Amendment: New 18 U.S.C. § 1349 provides that attempts and conspiracies to commit the substantive Federal fraud offenses listed above, as well as the new securities fraud offense, will have the same maximum punishment as the substantive crime. This section also effectively adds an "attempt" to commit the wire fraud offense as a federal crime. The remainder of the fraud statutes listed above already include "attempts."
New 18 U.S.C. § 1349 provides:
Any person who attempts or conspires to commit any offense under this chapter shall be subject to the same penalties as those prescribed for the offense, the commission of which was the object of the attempt or conspiracy.
Sec. 903. Criminal Penalties for Mail and Wire Fraud
Previous Law: The maximum term of imprisonment for violations of the mail and wire fraud statutes (18 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 1343) is 5 years, with the exception of fraud affecting a financial institution, which has a maximum term of incarceration of up to 30 years.
Amendment: This section amends 18 U.S.C. §§ 1341 and 1343 by increasing the maximum 5 year penalty for mail or wire fraud to 20 years. The maximum term of incarceration for fraud affecting a financial institution remains at a maximum of 30 years.
Sec. 904. Criminal Penalties for Violations of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974
Previous Law: Under 29 U.S.C. § 1131, any person who willfully violates the reporting and disclosure requirements concerning employee benefit plans as set forth in 29 U.S.C. §§ 1021-1031, or any regulation or order issued thereunder, is punishable by a fine, and/or a term of imprisonment not to exceed 1 year.
Amendment: This amendment increases the fines in Section 1131 to $100,000 (for an individual person), $500,000 (for persons other than an individual). Section 1131 also increases the maximum term of imprisonment from 1 year (a misdemeanor) to a maximum term of imprisonment of 10 years. The increase in the fine for individuals will have no limiting effect insofar as individuals convicted of violating Section 1131 will now be subject to the alternative fine provisions of 18 U.S.C. § 3571 for felony convictions. In the absence of restrictive language in Section 904 of the Act, individuals will be subject to the maximum fine of $250,000, or fine based on the defendant's gain or the victims loss, under § 3571. While the amendment also increases the fine in § 1131 to $500,000 for persons other than an individual, this change has merely increased the fine to the level of the maximum fine for an organization already set forth in § 3571.
Section 905. Amendment to the Sentencing Guidelines Relating to Certain White Collar Offenses
Previous Law: Questions have arisen whether the Sentencing Guidelines sufficiently address white collar offenses.
Amendment: This Section reaches beyond Section 803 of this Act, which addresses sentencing guidelines solely for obstruction of justice, to require that the Sentencing Commission study the existing guidelines and consider expedited issuance of amended guidelines within 180 days after enactment of this Act, which would address all the new criminal provisions and increased criminal penalties in this Act. This section also requires the Sentencing Commission to consider the broader issues of whether the white collar crime guidelines provide for sufficient deterrence and punishment, and assure reasonable consistency with other relevant directives and guidelines. The Attorney General has advised the Sentencing Commission of this provision and asked the Commission to implement it fully and expeditiously.
Section 906. Corporate Responsibility for Financial Reports
Previous Law: There are no statutory requirements that the chief executive officer or the chief financial officer certify certain periodic corporate financial statements. By instructions issued by the SEC for periodic and other filings, there was a general requirement that the forms had to be signed by officers, and in the case of annual reports, by a majority of the directors as well. These signing requirements did not include any type of certification or other attestation regarding the accuracy or completeness of the report. On June 20, 2002, the SEC published a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, contemplating a requirement that a company's chief executive officer and chief financial officer certify that the information contained in its financial reports is complete and true in all important respects. See 67 Fed. Reg. 41877 (2002). More recently, the SEC issued an order requiring that the principal executive officer and principal financial officer of the largest 947 companies whose securities are registered with the SEC certify the completeness, truth and accuracy of the most recent annual report, subsequent 10-Q and 8-K reports, and proxy materials filed with the Commission.
Amendment: This section enacts new 18 U.S.C. § 1350, which creates a requirement that the chief executive officer and the chief financial officer (or the equivalent thereof) of the "issuer" provide a statement which certifies that the periodic reports containing the financial statements, filed by an issuer with the SEC, fully comply with the requirements of Sections 13(a) and 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, and that the information contained in the periodic reports fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer. Certifying a report, knowing that it does not comport with all of the requirements of § 1350, is punishable by a fine of not more than $ 1,000,000 and imprisonment of up to 10 years. A willful violation is punishable by a fine of not more than $5,000,000 and imprisonment of up to 20 years.
New Section 1350 provides:
(a) CERTIFICATION OF PERIODIC FINANCIAL REPORTS.- Each periodic report containing financial statements filed by an issuer with the Securities Exchange Commission pursuant to section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m(a) or 78O(d)) shall be accompanied by a written statement by the chief executive officer and chief financial officer (or equivalent thereof) of the issuer.
(b) CONTENT.- The statement required under subsection (a) shall certify that the periodic report containing the financial statements fully complies with the requirements of section 13(a) or 15(d) of the Securities Exchange Act pf [sic] 1934 (15 U.S.C. 78m or 78o(d)) and that information contained in the periodic report fairly presents, in all material respects, the financial condition and results of operations of the issuer.
(c) CRIMINAL PENALTIES.- Whoever
(1) certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $1,000,000 or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both; or
(2) willfully certifies any statement as set forth in subsections (a) and (b) of this section knowing that the periodic report accompanying the statement does not comport with all the requirements set forth in this section shall be fined not more than $5,000,000, or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Sec. 1102. Tampering with a Record or Otherwise Impeding an Official Proceeding.
Previous Law: Title 18 U.S.C. § 1512, in part, provides a 10 year maximum term of incarceration for an offender who corruptly persuades another person with the intent to, in part, destroy or alter evidence.
Amendment: The amendment adds new subsection (c) to Section 1512 and renumbers existing subsections (c) through (i) as (d) through (j). New subsection (c) imposes a fine and/or a term of imprisonment of up to 20 years on any person who corruptly alters, destroys, mutilates or conceals a record, document or other object with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding, or who corruptly otherwise obstructs, influences or impedes an official proceeding. Section 1512, as amended, should be read in conjunction with the new Section 1519, added by section 802 of this Act, which criminalizes certain acts intended to impede, obstruct or influence "any matter" within the jurisdiction of any Department or agency of the United States, or in relation to or contemplation of any such matter. The term "corruptly" shall be construed as requiring proof of a criminal state of mind on the part of the defendant.
New Section 1512 (c) provides:
(c) Whoever corruptly-
(1) alters, destroys, mutilates, or conceals a record, document, or other object, or attempts to do so, with the intent to impair the object's integrity or availability for use in an official proceeding; or
(2) otherwise obstructs, influences, or impedes any official proceeding, or attempts to do so,
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or both.
Section 1104. Amendment to the Federal Sentencing Guidelines
Previous Law: Questions have arisen whether the current Sentencing Guidelines sufficiently address securities, accounting, and pension fraud, and related offenses.
Amendment: This section requests the Sentencing Commission to study existing guidelines and consider expedited issuance of amended guidelines within 180 days after enactment of this Act, which address securities, accounting, and pension fraud, and related offenses. The Attorney General has advised the Sentencing Commission of this provision and asked the Commission to implement it fully and expeditiously.
Section 1106. Increased Penalties Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934
Previous Law: Section 78ff of Title 15, Sec. 32(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, provides for a criminal fine of $1,000,000 for individuals and/or imprisonment of up to 10 years, or a fine of $2,500,000 for anyone other than an individual.
Amendment: This amendment increases the fine amounts to $5,000,000 and $25,000,000 respectively, and raises the maximum term of imprisonment to 20 years.
Section 1107. Retaliation Against Informants
Previous Law: There is no explicit protection from retaliation for an individual who provides truthful information to a law enforcement officer concerning the commission or possible commission of a Federal offense.
Amendment: New subsection (e) of 18 U.S.C. § 1513 creates a felony offense for any person knowingly to take any action, with intent to retaliate, harmful to a person who provides such information concerning a federal offense.
New subsection (e) of § 1513 provides:
(e) Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 10 years, or both.
Retroactive Application of the New Provisions:
The Ex Post Facto Clause prohibits, inter alia, punishing as a crime an act previously committed that was innocent when done and increasing the punishment for a crime after its commission. See, e.g., Carmell v. Texas, 520 U.S. 513, 522 (2000); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 42 (1990). The Act adds several new criminal provisions: 18 U.S.C. 1519 and 1520 (added by Section 802); 18 U.S.C. 1350 (added by Section 906); 18 U.S.C. 1512(c) (added by Section 1102), and 18 U.S.C. 1513(e) (added by Section 1107). Those new criminal provisions will apply only to criminal conduct committed after the effective date of the Act. The Act also includes criminal provisions increasing the punishment for some existing criminal offenses: 29 U.S.C. 1131 (added by Section 904) and 15 U.S.C. 78ff (added by Section 1106). The increased penalties set forth in those provisions will apply only to criminal conduct committed after the effective date of the Act.
Section 807 adds a new criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. 1348, that creates a felony for securities fraud punishable by up to 25 years' imprisonment. Section 903 amends the existing mail and wire fraud statutes, 18 U.S.C. 1341 and 1343, to increase the maximum term of imprisonment for schemes to defraud not affecting financial institutions to 20 years' imprisonment. Those provisions will apply to any criminal conduct committed after the effective date of the Act. It is unclear, however, whether those provisions can be applied to schemes to defraud that straddle the effective date of the Act, i.e., schemes begun before the effective date of the Act but continuing after the effective date of the Act. Generally, mail and wire fraud offenses are complete upon the use of the mails or wires. See, e.g., United States v. Barger, 178 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999). Similarly, the new securities fraud offense will likely be considered complete upon the execution of the scheme. Cf. United States v. De La Mata, 266 F.3d 1275, 1287 (11th Cir. 2001) (bank fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. 1344), cert. denied, 122 S. Ct. 1543 (2002). The Ex Post Facto Clause likely bars applying the new provisions to schemes to defraud that extend beyond the effective date of the Act if the use of the mails or wire in a mail or wire fraud scheme occurred before the effective date of the Act or the execution of a securities fraud scheme occurred before the effective date of the Act. On the other hand, the Ex Post Facto Clause should pose no bar to applying the new provisions to schemes to defraud that began before the effective date of the Act if the use of the mails or wire in a mail or wire fraud scheme occurred after the effective date of the Act or the execution of a securities fraud scheme occurred after the effective date of the Act.
Finally, Section 902 adds a new criminal provision, 18 U.S.C. 1349, that punishes attempts and conspiracies to commit fraud offenses, including the new securities fraud offense. The Ex Post Facto Clause should pose no bar to applying that provision to a conspiracy that straddles the effective date of the Act because conspiracy is considered a continuing offense. See, e.g., United States v. Hersh, No. 00-14592, 2002 WL 1574990 (11th Cir. July 17, 2002).
To better understand where law enforcement is going and how they plan to
proceed, the following memorandum regarding the Principles of Federal Prosecution
of Business Organizations is instructive.
MEMORANDUM
TO: Heads of Department Components
United States Attorneys
FROM: Larry D. Thompson
Deputy Attorney General
SUBJECT: Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations
Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations1
I. Charging a Corporation: General
A. General Principle: Corporations should not be treated leniently because
of their artificial nature nor should they be subject to harsher treatment.
Vigorous enforcement of the criminal laws against corporate wrongdoers, where
appropriate results in great benefits for law enforcement and the public,
particularly in the area of white collar crime. Indicting corporations for
wrongdoing enables the government to address and be a force for positive
change of corporate culture, alter corporate behavior, and prevent, discover,
and punish white collar crime.
B. Comment: In all cases involving corporate wrongdoing, prosecutors should
consider the factors discussed herein. First and foremost, prosecutors should
be aware of the important public benefits that may flow from indicting a
corporation in appropriate cases. For instance, corporations are likely to
take immediate remedial steps when one is indicted for criminal conduct that
is pervasive throughout a particular industry, and thus an indictment often
provides a unique opportunity for deterrence on a massive scale. In addition,
a corporate indictment may result in specific deterrence by changing the
culture of the indicted corporation and the behavior of its employees. Finally,
certain crimes that carry with them a substantial risk of great public harm,
e.g., environmental crimes or financial frauds, are by their nature most
likely to be committed by businesses, and there may, therefore, be a substantial
federal interest in indicting the corporation.
Charging a corporation, however, does not mean that individual directors,
officers, employees, or shareholders should not also be charged. Prosecution
of a corporation is not a substitute for the prosecution of criminally culpable
individuals within or without the corporation. Because a corporation can
act only through individuals, imposition of individual criminal liability
may provide the strongest deterrent against future corporate wrongdoing.
Only rarely should provable individual culpability not be pursued, even in
the face of offers of corporate guilty pleas.
Corporations are "legal persons," capable of suing and being sued,
and capable of committing crimes. Under the doctrine of respondeat superior,
a corporation may be held criminally liable for the illegal acts of its directors,
officers, employees, and agents. To hold a corporation liable for these actions,
the government must establish that the corporate agent's actions (i) were
within the scope of his duties and (ii) were intended, at least in part,
to benefit the corporation. In all cases involving wrongdoing by corporate
agents, prosecutors should consider the corporation, as well as the responsible
individuals, as potential criminal targets. Agents, however, may act for
mixed reasons -- both for self-aggrandizement (both direct and indirect)
and for the benefit of the corporation, and a corporation may be held liable
as long as one motivation of its agent is to benefit the corporation. In
United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories, 770 F.2d 399 (4th Cir. 1985),
the court affirmed the corporation's conviction for the actions of a subsidiary's
employee despite its claim that the employee was acting for his own benefit,
namely his "ambitious nature and his desire to ascend the corporate
ladder." The court stated, "Partucci was clearly acting in part
to benefit AML since his advancement within the corporation depended on AML's
well-being and its lack of difficulties with the FDA." Similarly, in
United States v. Cincotta, 689 F.2d 238, 241-42 (1st Cir. 1982), the court
held, "criminal liability may be imposed on the corporation only where
the agent is acting within the scope of his employment. That, in turn, requires
that the agent be performing acts of the kind which he is authorized to perform,
and those acts must be motivated -- at least in part -- by an intent to benefit
the corporation." Applying this test, the court upheld the corporation's
conviction, notwithstanding the substantial personal benefit reaped by its
miscreant agents, because the fraudulent scheme required money to pass through
the corporation's treasury and the fraudulently obtained goods were resold
to the corporation's customers in the corporation's name. As the court concluded, "Mystic--not
the individual defendants--was making money by selling oil that it had
not paid for."
Moreover, the corporation need not even necessarily profit from its agent's
actions for it to be held liable. In Automated Medical Laboratories, the
Fourth Circuit stated:
[B]enefit is not a "touchstone of criminal corporate liability; benefit
at best is an evidential, not an operative, fact." Thus, whether the
agent's actions ultimately redounded to the benefit of the corporation
is less significant than whether the agent acted with the intent to benefit
the corporation. The basic purpose of requiring that an agent have acted
with the intent to benefit the corporation, however, is to insulate the
corporation from criminal liability for actions of its agents which be
inimical to the interests of the corporation or which may have been undertaken
solely to advance the interests of that agent or of a party other than
the corporation.
770 F.2d at 407 (emphasis added; quoting Old Monastery Co. v. United States,
147 F.2d 905, 908 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 734 (1945)).
II. Charging a Corporation: Factors to Be Considered
A. General Principle: Generally, prosecutors should apply the same
factors in determining whether to charge a corporation as they do with
respect to individuals. See USAM § 9-27.220, et seq. Thus, the prosecutor should
weigh all of the factors normally considered in the sound exercise of prosecutorial
judgment: the sufficiency of the evidence; the likelihood of success at trial,;
the probable deterrent, rehabilitative, and other consequences of conviction;
and the adequacy of noncriminal approaches. See id. However, due to the nature
of the corporate "person," some additional factors are present.
In conducting an investigation, determining whether to bring charges, and
negotiating plea agreements, prosecutors should consider the following
factors in reaching a decision as to the proper treatment of a corporate
target:
1. the nature and seriousness of the offense, including the risk of harm
to the public, and applicable policies and priorities, if any, governing
the prosecution of corporations for particular categories of crime (see section
III, infra);
2. the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation, including the
complicity in, or condonation of, the wrongdoing by corporate management
(see section IV, infra);
3. the corporation's history of similar conduct, including prior criminal,
civil, and regulatory enforcement actions against it (see section V, infra);
4. the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate in the investigation of its agents, including, if
necessary, the waiver of corporate attorney-client and work product protection
(see section VI, infra);
5. the existence and adequacy of the corporation's compliance program (see
section VII, infra);
6. the corporation's remedial actions, including any efforts to implement
an effective corporate compliance program or to improve an existing one,
to replace responsible management, to discipline or terminate wrongdoers,
to pay restitution, and to cooperate with the relevant government agencies
(see section VIII, infra); 7. collateral consequences, including disproportionate
harm to shareholders, pension holders and employees not proven personally
culpable and impact on the public arising from the prosecution (see section
IX, infra); and
8. the adequacy of the prosecution of individuals responsible for the corporation's
malfeasance;
9. the adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory enforcement actions
(see section X, infra).
B. Comment: As with the factors relevant to charging natural persons, the
foregoing factors are intended to provide guidance rather than to mandate
a particular result. The factors listed in this section are intended to be
illustrative of those that should be considered and not a complete or exhaustive
list. Some or all of these factors may or may not apply to specific cases,
and in some cases one factor may override all others. The nature and seriousness
of the offense may be such as to warrant prosecution regardless of the other
factors. Further, national law enforcement policies in various enforcement
areas may require that more or less weight be given to certain of these factors
than to others.
In making a decision to charge a corporation, the prosecutor generally
has wide latitude in determining when, whom, how, and even whether to prosecute
for violations of Federal criminal law. In exercising that discretion,
prosecutors should consider the following general statements of principles
that summarize appropriate considerations to be weighed and desirable practices
to be followed in discharging their prosecutorial responsibilities. In
doing so, prosecutors should ensure that the general purposes of the criminal
law -- assurance of warranted punishment, deterrence of further criminal
conduct, protection of the public from dangerous and fraudulent conduct,
rehabilitation of offenders, and restitution for victims and affected communities
-- are adequately met, taking into account the special nature of the corporate "person."
III. Charging a Corporation: Special Policy Concerns
A. General Principle: The nature and seriousness of the crime, including
the risk of harm to the public from the criminal conduct, are obviously primary
factors in determining whether to charge a corporation. In addition, corporate
conduct, particularly that of national and multi-national corporations, necessarily
intersects with federal economic, taxation, and criminal law enforcement
policies. In applying these principles, prosecutors must consider the practices
and policies of the appropriate Division of the Department, and must comply
with those policies to the extent required.
B. Comment: In determining whether to charge a corporation, prosecutors
should take into account federal law enforcement priorities as discussed
above. See USAM § 9-27-230. In addition, however, prosecutors must
be aware of the specific policy goals and incentive programs established
by the respective Divisions and regulatory agencies. Thus, whereas natural
persons may be given incremental degrees of credit (ranging from immunity
to lesser charges to sentencing considerations) for turning themselves
in, making statements against their penal interest, and cooperating in
the government's investigation of their own and others' wrongdoing, the
same approach may not be appropriate in all circumstances with respect
to corporations. As an example, it is entirely proper in many investigations
for a prosecutor to consider the corporation's pre-indictment conduct,
e.g.,voluntary disclosure, cooperation, remediation or restitution, in
determining whether to seek an indictment. However, this would not necessarily
be appropriate in an antitrust investigation, in which antitrust violations,
by definition, go to the heart of the corporation's business and for which
the Antitrust Division has therefore established a firm policy, understood
in the business community, that credit should not be given at the charging
stage for a compliance program and that amnesty is available only to the
first corporation to make full disclosure to the government. As another
example, the Tax Division has a strong preference for prosecuting responsible
individuals, rather than entities, for corporate tax offenses. Thus, in
determining whether or not to charge a corporation, prosecutors should
consult with the Criminal, Antitrust, Tax, and Environmental and Natural
Resources Divisions, if appropriate or required.
IV. Charging a Corporation: Pervasiveness of Wrongdoing Within the Corporation
A. General Principle: A corporation can only act through natural persons,
and it is therefore held responsible for the acts of such persons fairly
attributable to it. Charging a corporation for even minor misconduct may
be appropriate where the wrongdoing was pervasive and was undertaken by a
large number of employees or by all the employees in a particular role within
the corporation, e.g., salesmen or procurement officers, or was condoned
by upper management. On the other hand, in certain limited circumstances,
it may not be appropriate to impose liability upon a corporation, particularly
one with a compliance program in place, under a strict respondeat superior
theory for the single isolated act of a rogue employee. There is, of course,
a wide spectrum between these two extremes, and a prosecutor should exercise
sound discretion in evaluating the pervasiveness of wrongdoing within a corporation.
B. Comment: Of these factors, the most important is the role of management.
Although acts of even low-level employees may result in criminal liability,
a corporation is directed by its management and management is responsible
for a corporate culture in which criminal conduct is either discouraged or
tacitly encouraged. As stated in commentary to the Sentencing Guidelines:
Pervasiveness [is] case specific and [will] depend on the number, and degree
of responsibility, of individuals [with] substantial authority ... who
participated in, condoned, or were willfully ignorant of the offense. Fewer
individuals need to be involved for a finding of pervasiveness if those
individuals exercised a relatively high degree of authority. Pervasiveness
can occur either within an organization as a whole or within a unit of
an organization. USSG §8C2.5,
comment. (n. 4).
V. Charging a Corporation: The Corporation's Past History
A. General Principle: Prosecutors may consider a corporation's history
of similar conduct, including prior criminal, civil, and regulatory enforcement
actions against it, in determining whether to bring criminal charges.
B. Comment: A corporation, like a natural person, is expected to learn
from its mistakes. A history of similar conduct may be probative of a corporate
culture that encouraged, or at least condoned, such conduct, regardless
of any compliance programs. Criminal prosecution of a corporation may be
particularly appropriate where the corporation previously had been subject
to non-criminal guidance, warnings, or sanctions, or previous criminal
charges, and yet it either had not taken adequate action to prevent future
unlawful conduct or had continued to engage in the conduct in spite of
the warnings or enforcement actions taken against it. In making this determination,
the corporate structure itself, e.g., subsidiaries or operating divisions,
should be ignored, and enforcement actions taken against the corporation
or any of its divisions, subsidiaries, and affiliates should be considered.
See USSG § 8C2.5(c) & comment.
(n. 6).
VI. Charging a Corporation: Cooperation and Voluntary Disclosure
A. General Principle: In determining whether to charge a corporation,
that corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing and its
willingness to cooperate with the government's investigation may be relevant
factors. In gauging the extent of the corporation's cooperation, the prosecutor
may consider the corporation's willingness to identify the culprits within
the corporation, including senior executives; to make witnesses available;
to disclose the complete results of its internal investigation; and to waive
attorney-client and work product protection.
B. Comment: In investigating wrongdoing by or within a corporation, a prosecutor
is likely to encounter several obstacles resulting from the nature of the
corporation itself. It will often be difficult to determine which individual
took which action on behalf of the corporation. Lines of authority and responsibility
may be shared among operating divisions or departments, and records and personnel
may be spread throughout the United States or even among several countries.
Where the criminal conduct continued over an extended period of time, the
culpable or knowledgeable personnel may have been promoted, transferred,
or fired, or they may have quit or retired. Accordingly, a corporation's
cooperation may be critical in identifying the culprits and locating relevant
evidence.
In some circumstances, therefore, granting a corporation immunity or amnesty
or pretrial diversion may be considered in the course of the government's
investigation. In such circumstances, prosecutors should refer to the principles
governing non-prosecution agreements generally. See USAM § 9-27.600-650.
These principles permit a non prosecution agreement in exchange for cooperation
when a corporation's "timely cooperation appears to be necessary to
the public interest and other means of obtaining the desired cooperation
are unavailable or would not be effective." Prosecutors should note
that in the case of national or multi-national corporations, multi-district
or global agreements may be necessary. Such agreements may only be entered
into with the approval of each affected district or the appropriate Department
official. See USAM §9-27.641.
In addition, the Department, in conjunction with regulatory agencies and
other executive branch departments, encourages corporations, as part of their
compliance programs, to conduct internal investigations and to disclose their
findings to the appropriate authorities. Some agencies, such as the SEC and
the EPA, as well as the Department's Environmental and Natural Resources
Division, have formal voluntary disclosure programs in which self-reporting,
coupled with remediation and additional criteria, may qualify the corporation
for amnesty or reduced sanctions.2 Even in the absence of a formal program,
prosecutors may consider a corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure
in evaluating the adequacy of the corporation's compliance program and its
management's commitment to the compliance program. However, prosecution and
economic policies specific to the industry or statute may require prosecution
notwithstanding a corporation's willingness to cooperate. For example, the
Antitrust Division offers amnesty only to the first corporation to agree
to cooperate. This creates a strong incentive for corporations participating
in anti-competitive conduct to be the first to cooperate. In addition, amnesty,
immunity, or reduced sanctions may not be appropriate where the corporation's
business is permeated with fraud or other crimes.
One factor the prosecutor may weigh in assessing the adequacy of a corporation's
cooperation is the completeness of its disclosure including, if necessary,
a waiver of the attorney-client and work product protections, both with respect
to its internal investigation and with respect to communications between
specific officers, directors and employees and counsel. Such waivers permit
the government to obtain statements of possible witnesses, subjects, and
targets, without having to negotiate individual cooperation or immunity agreements.
In addition, they are often critical in enabling the government to evaluate
the completeness of a corporation's voluntary disclosure and cooperation.
Prosecutors may, therefore, request a waiver in appropriate circumstances.3
The Department does not, however, consider waiver of a corporation's attorney-client
and work product protection an absolute requirement, and prosecutors should
consider the willingness of a corporation to waive such protection when necessary
to provide timely and complete information as one factor in evaluating the
corporation's cooperation. Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor
is whether the corporation appears to be protecting its culpable employees
and agents. Thus, while cases will differ depending on the circumstances,
a corporation's promise of support to culpable employees and agents, either
through the advancing of attorneys fees,4 through retaining the employees
without sanction for their misconduct, or through providing information to
the employees about the government's investigation pursuant to a joint defense
agreement, may be considered by the prosecutor in weighing the extent and
value of a corporation's cooperation. By the same token, the prosecutor should
be wary of attempts to shield corporate officers and employees from liability
by a willingness of the corporation to plead guilty.
Another factor to be weighed by the prosecutor is whether the corporation,
while purporting to cooperate, has engaged in conduct that impedes the investigation
(whether or not rising to the level of criminal obstruction). Examples of
such conduct include: overly broad assertions of corporate representation
of employees or former employees; inappropriate directions to employees or
their counsel, such as directions not to cooperate openly and fully with
the investigation including, for example, the direction to decline to be
interviewed; making presentations or submissions that contain misleading
assertions or omissions; incomplete or delayed production of records; and
failure to promptly disclose illegal conduct known to the corporation.
Finally, a corporation's offer of cooperation does not automatically entitle
it to immunity from prosecution. A corporation should not be able to escape
liability merely by offering up its directors, officers, employees, or agents
as in lieu of its own prosecution. Thus, a corporation's willingness to cooperate
is merely one relevant factor, that needs to be considered in conjunction
with the other factors, particularly those relating to the corporation's
past history and the role of management in the wrongdoing.
VII. Charging a Corporation: Corporate Compliance Programs
A. General Principle: Compliance programs are established by corporate
management to prevent and to detect misconduct and to ensure that corporate
activities are conducted in accordance with all applicable criminal and civil
laws, regulations, and rules. The Department encourages such corporate self-policing,
including voluntary disclosures to the government of any problems that a
corporation discovers on its own. However, the existence of a compliance
program is not sufficient, in and of itself, to justify not charging a corporation
for criminal conduct undertaken by its officers, directors, employees, or
agents. Indeed, the commission of such crimes in the face of a compliance
program may suggest that the corporate management is not adequately enforcing
its program. In addition, the nature of some crimes, e.g., antitrust violations,
may be such that national law enforcement policies mandate prosecutions of
corporations notwithstanding the existence of a compliance program.
B. Comment: A corporate compliance program, even one specifically prohibiting
the very conduct in question, does not absolve the corporation from criminal
liability under the doctrine of respondeat superior. See United States
v. Basic Construction Co., 711 F.2d 570 (4th Cir. 1983) ("a corporation
may be held criminally responsible for antitrust violations committed by
its employees if they were acting within the scope of their authority, or
apparent authority, and for the benefit of the corporation, even if... such
acts were against corporate policy or express instructions."). In United
States v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 467 F.2d 1000 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1125 (1973), the Ninth Circuit affirmed antitrust liability based
upon a purchasing agent for a single hotel threatening a single supplier
with a boycott unless it paid dues to a local marketing association, even
though the agent's actions were contrary to corporate policy and directly
against express instructions from his superiors. The court reasoned that
Congress, in enacting the Sherman Antitrust Act, "intended to impose
liability upon business entities for the acts of those to whom they choose
to delegate the conduct of their affairs, thus stimulating a maximum effort
by owners and managers to assure adherence by such agents to the requirements
of the Act."5 It concluded that "general policy statements" and
even direct instructions from the agent's superiors were not sufficient; "Appellant
could not gain exculpation by issuing general instructions without undertaking
to enforce those instructions by means commensurate with the obvious risks." See
also United States v. Beusch, 596 F.2d 871, 878 (9th Cir. 1979) ("[A]
corporation may be liable for the acts of its employees done contrary to
express instructions and policies, but ... the existence of such instructions
and policies may be considered in determining whether the employee in fact
acted to benefit the corporation."); United States v. American Radiator & Standard
Sanitary Corp., 433 F.2d 174 (3rd Cir. 1970) (affirming conviction of corporation
based upon its officer's participation in price-fixing scheme, despite corporation's
defense that officer's conduct violated its "rigid anti-fraternization
policy" against any socialization (and exchange of price information)
with its competitors; "When the act of the agent is within the scope
of his employment or his apparent authority, the corporation is held legally
responsible for it, although what he did may be contrary to his actual instructions
and may be unlawful."). While the Department recognizes that no compliance
program can ever prevent all criminal activity by a corporation's employees,
the critical factors in evaluating any program are whether the program is
adequately designed for maximum effectiveness in preventing and detecting
wrongdoing by employees and whether corporate management is enforcing the
program or is tacitly encouraging or pressuring employees to engage in misconduct
to achieve business objectives. The Department has no formal guidelines for
corporate compliance programs. The fundamental questions any prosecutor should
ask are: "Is the corporation's compliance program well designed?" and "Does
the corporation's compliance program work?" In answering these questions,
the prosecutor should consider the comprehensiveness of the compliance
program; the extent and pervasiveness of the criminal conduct; the number
and level of the corporate employees involved; the seriousness, duration,
and frequency of the misconduct; and any remedial actions taken by the
corporation, including restitution, disciplinary action, and revisions
to corporate compliance programs.6 Prosecutors should also consider the
promptness of any disclosure of wrongdoing to the government and the corporation's
cooperation in the government's investigation. In evaluating compliance
programs, prosecutors may consider whether the corporation has established
corporate governance mechanisms that can effectively detect and prevent
misconduct. For example, do the corporation's directors exercise independent
review over proposed corporate actions rather than unquestioningly ratifying
officers' recommendations; are the directors provided with information
sufficient to enable the exercise of independent judgment, are internal
audit functions conducted at a level sufficient to ensure their independence
and accuracy and have the directors established an information and reporting
system in the organization reasonable designed to provide management and
the board of directors with timely and accurate information sufficient
to allow them to reach an informed decision regarding the organization's
compliance with the law. In re: Caremark, 698 A.2d 959 (Del. Ct. Chan.
1996).
Prosecutors should therefore attempt to determine whether a corporation's
compliance program is merely a "paper program" or whether it
was designed and implemented in an effective manner. In addition, prosecutors
should determine whether the corporation has provided for a staff sufficient
to audit, document, analyze, and utilize the results of the corporation's
compliance efforts. In addition, prosecutors should determine whether the
corporation's employees are adequately informed about the compliance program
and are convinced of the corporation's commitment to it. This will enable
the prosecutor to make an informed decision as to whether the corporation
has adopted and implemented a truly effective compliance program that,
when consistent with other federal law enforcement policies, may result
in a decision to charge only the corporation's employees and agents.
Compliance programs should be designed to detect the particular types of
misconduct most likely to occur in a particular corporation's line of business.
Many corporations operate in complex regulatory environments outside the
normal experience of criminal prosecutors. Accordingly, prosecutors should
consult with relevant federal and state agencies with the expertise to evaluate
the adequacy of a program's design and implementation. For instance, state
and federal banking, insurance, and medical boards, the Department of Defense,
the Department of Health and Human Services, the Environmental Protection
Agency, and the Securities and Exchange Commission have considerable experience
with compliance programs and can be very helpful to a prosecutor in evaluating
such programs. In addition, the Fraud Section of the Criminal Division, the
Commercial Litigation Branch of the Civil Division, and the Environmental
Crimes Section of the Environment and Natural Resources Division can assist
U.S. Attorneys' Offices in finding the appropriate agency office and in providing
copies of compliance programs that were developed in previous cases.
VIII. Charging a Corporation: Restitution and Remediation
A. General Principle: Although neither a corporation nor an individual
target may avoid prosecution merely by paying a sum of money, a prosecutor
may consider the corporation's willingness to make restitution and steps
already taken to do so. A prosecutor may also consider other remedial actions,
such as implementing an effective corporate compliance program, improving
an existing compliance program, and disciplining wrongdoers, in determining
whether to charge the corporation. B. Comment: In determining whether or
not a corporation should be prosecuted, a prosecutor may consider whether
meaningful remedial measures have been taken, including employee discipline
and full restitution.7 A corporation's response to misconduct says much about
its willingness to ensure that such misconduct does not recur. Thus, corporations
that fully recognize the seriousness of their misconduct and accept responsibility
for it should be taking steps to implement the personnel, operational, and
organizational changes necessary to establish an awareness among employees
that criminal conduct will not be tolerated. Among the factors prosecutors
should consider and weigh are whether the corporation appropriately disciplined
the wrongdoers and disclosed information concerning their illegal conduct
to the government.
Employee discipline is a difficult task for many corporations because of
the human element involved and sometimes because of the seniority of the
employees concerned. While corporations need to be fair to their employees,
they must also be unequivocally committed, at all levels of the corporation,
to the highest standards of legal and ethical behavior. Effective internal
discipline can be a powerful deterrent against improper behavior by a corporation's
employees. In evaluating a corporation's response to wrongdoing, prosecutors
may evaluate the willingness of the corporation to discipline culpable employees
of all ranks and the adequacy of the discipline imposed. The prosecutor should
be satisfied that the corporation's focus is on the integrity and credibility
of its remedial and disciplinary measures rather than on the protection of
the wrongdoers.
In addition to employee discipline, two other factors used in evaluating
a corporation's remedial efforts are restitution and reform. As with natural
persons, the decision whether or not to prosecute should not depend upon
the target's ability to pay restitution. A corporation's efforts to pay
restitution even in advance of any court order is, however, evidence of
its "acceptance
of responsibility" and, consistent with the practices and policies
of the appropriate Division of the Department entrusted with enforcing
specific criminal laws, may be considered in determining whether to bring
criminal charges. Similarly, although the inadequacy of a corporate compliance
program is a factor to consider when deciding whether to charge a corporation,
that corporation's quick recognition of the flaws in the program and its
efforts to improve the program are also factors to consider.
IX. Charging a Corporation: Collateral Consequences
A. General Principle: Prosecutors may consider the collateral consequences
of a corporate criminal conviction in determining whether to charge the corporation
with a criminal offense.
B. Comment: One of the factors in determining whether to charge a natural
person or a corporation is whether the likely punishment is appropriate
given the nature and seriousness of the crime. In the corporate context,
prosecutors may take into account the possibly substantial consequences
to a corporation's officers, directors, employees, and shareholders, many
of whom may, depending on the size and nature (e.g., publicly vs. closely
held) of the corporation and their role in its operations, have played
no role in the criminal conduct, have been completely unaware of it, or
have been wholly unable to prevent it. Prosecutors should also be aware
of non-penal sanctions that may accompany a criminal charge, such as potential
suspension or debarment from eligibility for government contracts or federal
funded programs such as health care. Whether or not such non-penal sanctions
are appropriate or required in a particular case is the responsibility
of the relevant agency, a decision that will be made based on the applicable
statutes, regulations, and policies. Virtually every conviction of a corporation,
like virtually every conviction of an individual, will have an impact on
innocent third parties, and the mere existence of such an effect is not
sufficient to preclude prosecution of the corporation. Therefore, in evaluating
the severity of collateral consequences, various factors already discussed,
such as the pervasiveness of the criminal conduct and the adequacy of the
corporation's compliance programs, should be considered in determining
the weight to be given to this factor. For instance, the balance may tip
in favor of prosecuting corporations in situations where the scope of the
misconduct in a case is widespread and sustained within a corporate division
(or spread throughout pockets of the corporate organization). In such cases,
the possible unfairness of visiting punishment for the corporation's crimes
upon shareholders may be of much less concern where those shareholders
have substantially profited, even unknowingly, from widespread or pervasive
criminal activity. Similarly, where the top layers of the corporation's
management or the shareholders of a closely-held corporation were engaged
in or aware of the wrongdoing and the conduct at issue was accepted as
a way of doing business for an extended period, debarment may be deemed
not collateral, but a direct and entirely appropriate consequence of the
corporation's wrongdoing. The appropriateness of considering such collateral
consequences and the weight to be given them may depend on the special
policy concerns discussed in section III, supra.
X. Charging a Corporation: Non-Criminal Alternatives
A. General Principle: Although non-criminal alternatives to prosecution
often exist, prosecutors may consider whether such sanctions would adequately
deter, punish, and rehabilitate a corporation that has engaged in wrongful
conduct. In evaluating the adequacy of non-criminal alternatives to prosecution,
e.g., civil or regulatory enforcement actions, the prosecutor may consider
all relevant factors, including:
1. the sanctions available under the alternative means of disposition;
2. the likelihood that an effective sanction will be imposed; and
3. the effect of non-criminal disposition on Federal law enforcement interests.
B. Comment: The primary goals of criminal law are deterrence, punishment,
and rehabilitation. Non-criminal sanctions may not be an appropriate response
to an egregious violation, a pattern of wrongdoing, or a history of non-criminal
sanctions without proper remediation. In other cases, however, these goals
may be satisfied without the necessity of instituting criminal proceedings.
In determining whether federal criminal charges are appropriate, the prosecutor
should consider the same factors (modified appropriately for the regulatory
context) considered when determining whether to leave prosecution of a
natural person to another jurisdiction or to seek non-criminal alternatives
to prosecution. These factors include: the strength of the regulatory authority's
interest; the regulatory authority's ability and willingness to take effective
enforcement action; the probable sanction if the regulatory authority's
enforcement action is upheld; and the effect of a non-criminal disposition
on Federal law enforcement interests. See USAM §§ 9-27.240, 9-27.250.
XI. Charging a Corporation: Selecting Charges
A. General Principle: Once a prosecutor has decided to charge a corporation,
the prosecutor should charge, or should recommend that the grand jury charge,
the most serious offense that is consistent with the nature of the defendant's
conduct and that is likely to result in a sustainable conviction.
B. Comment: Once the decision to charge is made, the same rules as govern
charging natural persons apply. These rules require "a faithful and
honest application of the Sentencing Guidelines" and an "individualized
assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit the specific circumstances
of the case, are consistent with the purposes of the Federal criminal code,
and maximize the impact of Federal resources on crime." See USAM § 9-27.300.
In making this determination, "it is appropriate that the attorney for
the government consider, inter alia, such factors as the sentencing guideline
range yielded by the charge, whether the penalty yielded by such sentencing
range ... is proportional to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct,
and whether the charge achieves such purposes of the criminal law as punishment,
protection of the public, specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation." See
Attorney General's Memorandum, dated October 12, 1993.
XII. Plea Agreements with Corporations
A. General Principle: In negotiating plea agreements with corporations,
prosecutors should seek a plea to the most serious, readily provable offense
charged. In addition, the terms of the plea agreement should contain appropriate
provisions to ensure punishment, deterrence, rehabilitation, and compliance
with the plea agreement in the corporate context. Although special circumstances
may mandate a different conclusion, prosecutors generally should not agree
to accept a corporate guilty plea in exchange for non-prosecution or dismissal
of charges against individual officers and employees.
B. Comment: Prosecutors may enter into plea agreements with corporations
for the same reasons and under the same constraints as apply to plea agreements
with natural persons. See USAM §§ 9-27.400-500. This means, inter
alia, that the corporation should be required to plead guilty to the most
serious, readily provable offense charged. As is the case with individuals,
the attorney making this determination should do so "on the basis of
an individualized assessment of the extent to which particular charges fit
the specific circumstances of the case, are consistent with the purposes
of the federal criminal code, and maximize the impact of federal resources
on crime. In making this determination, the attorney for the government considers,
inter alia, such factors as the sentencing guideline range yielded by the
charge, whether the penalty yielded by such sentencing range ... is proportional
to the seriousness of the defendant's conduct, and whether the charge achieves
such purposes of the criminal law as punishment, protection of the public,
specific and general deterrence, and rehabilitation." See Attorney General's
Memorandum, dated October 12, 1993. In addition, any negotiated departures
from the Sentencing Guidelines must be justifiable under the Guidelines and
must be disclosed to the sentencing court. A corporation should be made to
realize that pleading guilty to criminal charges constitutes an admission
of guilt and not merely a resolution of an inconvenient distraction from
its business. As with natural persons, pleas should be structured so that
the corporation may not later "proclaim lack of culpability or even
complete innocence." See USAM §§ 9-27.420(b)(4), 9-27.440,
9-27.500. Thus, for instance, there should be placed upon the record a
sufficient factual basis for the plea to prevent later corporate assertions
of innocence.
A corporate plea agreement should also contain provisions that recognize
the nature of the corporate "person" and ensure that the principles
of punishment, deterrence, and rehabilitation are met. In the corporate context,
punishment and deterrence are generally accomplished by substantial fines,
mandatory restitution, and institution of appropriate compliance measures,
including, if necessary, continued judicial oversight or the use of special
masters. See USSG §§ 8B1.1, 8C2.1, et seq. In addition, where
the corporation is a government contractor, permanent or temporary debarment
may be appropriate. Where the corporation was engaged in government contracting
fraud, a prosecutor may not negotiate away an agency's right to debar or
to list the corporate defendant.
In negotiating a plea agreement, prosecutors should also consider the deterrent
value of prosecutions of individuals within the corporation. Therefore, one
factor that a prosecutor may consider in determining whether to enter into
a plea agreement is whether the corporation is seeking immunity for its employees
and officers or whether the corporation is willing to cooperate in the investigation
of culpable individuals. Prosecutors should rarely negotiate away individual
criminal liability in a corporate plea.
Rehabilitation, of course, requires that the corporation undertake to be
law-abiding in the future. It is, therefore, appropriate to require the corporation,
as a condition of probation, to implement a compliance program or to reform
an existing one. As discussed above, prosecutors may consult with the appropriate
state and federal agencies and components of the Justice Department to ensure
that a proposed compliance program is adequate and meets industry standards
and best practices. See section VII, supra.
In plea agreements in which the corporation agrees to cooperate, the prosecutor
should ensure that the cooperation is complete and truthful. To do so, the
prosecutor may request that the corporation waive attorney-client and work
product protection, make employees and agents available for debriefing, disclose
the results of its internal investigation, file appropriate certified financial
statements, agree to governmental or third-party audits, and take whatever
other steps are necessary to ensure that the full scope of the corporate
wrongdoing is disclosed and that the responsible culprits are identified
and, if appropriate, prosecuted. See generally section VIII, supra.
Footnotes:
1. While these guidelines refer to corporations, they apply to the consideration
of the prosecution of all types of business organizations, including partnerships,
sole proprietorships, government entities, and unincorporated associations.
2. In addition, the Sentencing Guidelines reward voluntary disclosure and
cooperation with a reduction in the corporation's offense level. See USSG §8C2.5)g).
3. This waiver should ordinarily be limited to the factual internal investigation
and any contemporaneous advice given to the corporation concerning the
conduct at issue. Except in unusual circumstances, prosecutors should not
seek a waiver with respect to communications and work product related to
advice concerning the government's criminal investigation.
4. Some states require corporations to pay the legal fees of officers under
investigation prior to a formal determination of their guilt. Obviously,
a corporation's compliance with governing law should not be considered a
failure to cooperate.
5. Although this case and Basic Construction are both antitrust cases,
their reasoning applies to other criminal violations. In the Hilton case,
for instance, the Ninth Circuit noted that Sherman Act violations are commercial
offenses "usually
motivated by a desire to enhance profits," thus, bringing the case within
the normal rule that a "purpose to benefit the corporation is necessary
to bring the agent's acts within the scope of his employment." 467 F.2d
at 1006 & n4. In addition, in United States v. Automated Medical Laboratories,
770 F.2d 399, 406 n.5 (4th Cir. 1985), the Fourth Circuit stated "that
Basic Construction states a generally applicable rule on corporate criminal
liability despite the fact that it addresses violations of the antitrust
laws."
6. For a detailed review of these and other factors concerning corporate
compliance programs, see United States Sentencing Commission, GUIDELINES
MANUAL, §8A1.2, comment. (n.3(k)) (Nov. 1997). See also USSG §8C2.5(f)
7. For example, the Antitrust Division's amnesty policy requires that "[w]here
possible, the corporation [make] restitution to injured parties...."
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